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STATE REGULATION OF MEDICAL
NECESSITY: THE CASE OF
WEIGHT-REDUCTION SURGERY
MARK A. HALL†
INTRODUCTION
As Professor Sage so ably explains,1 medical necessity is the
ground on which health care’s cost/quality tradeoff battles are most
visibly fought. The primary mechanism an insurer has for exercising
case-by-case control over excessive medical costs is reviewing
whether treatment meets the insurer’s definition of medical necessity.
Therefore, regulatory controls over medical necessity determinations
are of immense importance for how medical spending decisions are
made.
This Comment explores how state managed care regulations, and
in particular, external review laws, affect health insurers’ ability to
define and apply medical necessity. As summarized by Professor Sage
and others, external review laws, which exist in most states, allow
patients to appeal to an independent physician when denials of
2
insurance coverage are based on lack of medical necessity. Most
states also define what medical necessity means for purposes of health
3
insurance coverage. Some commentators have expressed concern
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1. William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and
the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 595 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Aaron Kesselheim, What’s the Appeal? Trying to Control Managed Care
Medical Necessity Decisionmaking through a System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
873, 877 (2001) (stating that “by 1999 thirty states and the District of Columbia had established
rights to external review for private health plan enrollees”).
3. STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY, STATE-BY-STATE COMPENDIUM OF
MEDICAL NECESSITY REGULATION 12–14 (2001), available at http://www.hcfo.net/
pdf/stanford.pdf.
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that state or federal regulation of medical necessity will substantially
curtail insurers’ ability to contain costs and manage care in a
4
responsible and socially productive manner.
Exploring this concern was one objective of an empirical study I
conducted in 2002 to assess the impact of state managed care patient
5
protection laws. Six states were selected for in-depth case studies—
Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, and Virginia—to
reflect a range of market, demographic, and legal characteristics. In
each state, confidential interviews were conducted with twenty to
thirty key informants, including health plan managers, regulators,
patient advocates, and various industry observers. In addition, a focus
group was conducted with nine experienced health care lawyers from
across the country, and interviews were conducted at the home office
of three of the largest national health plans. The total of 178 interview
and focus group subjects consisted of 56 people with 28 health plans
or insurance industry groups; 38 providers or patient advocates; 43
insurance agents, human resource managers, or employer
representatives; and 41 regulators, industry analysts, independent
lawyers, or other market participants or observers.
Interviews were semistructured, following an interview guide
that allowed for substantial variation to focus on the topics of
particular relevance to different interview subjects. Each interview
included some discussion of external review and the definition of
medical necessity, but the interviews covered a broad range of other
issues relating to managed care patient protection laws.
This Comment reports on the findings from these interviews
relating to states’ regulation of medical necessity, using bariatric
surgery as the main case in point. It begins with an overview of
bariatric surgery and its prominence in external review decisions. The
Comment then analyzes insurers’ various strategic responses to their
persistent record of reversals in these cases. The article concludes that

4. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 93 (Autumn 2002) (“External review essentially denies health plans any
intermediary roles in selecting treatments. . . . [S]uch regulation drastically curtail[s]
opportunities for health plans to . . . achieve consistency in administering . . . benefits.”); David
A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 221, 260–61 (2000) (“Specific consumer protections have become legislative priorities
simply because they appear to benefit a specific group of voters, or because they play well in the
press—regardless of the practical significance of the problem, or the benefits of the reform.”).
5. Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation
of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169 (Autumn 2002).
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most insurers limit coverage of bariatric surgery in some fashion,
rather than covering it with few or no questions asked. In this one
area, then, insurers have not completely abandoned their role as
stewards of limited medical resources, despite considerable regulatory
and public pressure to relent. This area stands apart from most areas
of medicine, however, in that insurers have largely abandoned direct
attempts to limit coverage for most medical procedures and instead
have adopted a pass-through attitude toward medical spending.
I. BARIATRIC SURGERY
Surgery for weight reduction is the focal point for reporting these
research findings because interview subjects so frequently mentioned
these procedures as a controversial issue in the external review
process. Surveys of external review decisions in California and Texas
found that this is the single most frequently appealed medical-surgical
procedure (as distinguished from behavioral health care),6 and my
interviews also confirmed this to be the case in other states.
Moreover, insurers said that they always or almost always lose these
appeals, in contrast with their overall track record of winning about
7
half the time, or even more often in some states.
Each decade, a new area of medicine emerges that seems to
epitomize the issues of greatest salience for the resource allocation
issues of the day. In the 1980s, many litigated coverage disputes

6. See David M. Studdert & Carole Roan Gresenz, Enrollee Appeals of Preservice
Coverage Denials at 2 Health Maintenance Organizations, 289 JAMA 864, 867–68 (2003)
(finding that one in ten medical necessity appeals in California involved obesity treatment);
Consumers Union, Independent Review Organizations: Consumers Gain Needed Care When
Unaffiliated Medical Experts Review Health Plan Denials (May 2002) (reporting that of 263
Texas cases reviewed, surgical treatment for obesity was the only medical-surgical procedure
consistently appealed).
7. Consumers Union found that insurers lose these cases 70 percent of the time in Texas,
compared with their overall loss rate of about 50 percent. Consumers Union, supra note 6, at 8.
One lawyer who specializes in challenging coverage denials for obesity treatment claims to have
a 90 percent success rate when these denials are based on lack of medical necessity. See Obesity
Law & Advocacy Ctr., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s), at http://www.obesitylaw.com/
faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). Another confirmation comes from casual perusal of
patients’ descriptions of dealings with their insurance companies, posted on the following
website: http://www.obesityhelp.com/morbid obesity/insurers.phtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
The vast majority of these patients say they were successful in obtaining coverage, either at an
initial stage of consideration, or on appeal. Id. However, Studdert & Gresenz report that two
insurers studied in California win these cases more often than other appeals. Studdert &
Gresenz, supra note 6, at 867.
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8
addressed various unorthodox treatments for cancer. In the 1990s,
the focus shifted to technologically advanced experimental treatments
9
for cancer. During the same period, skirmishes erupted over
treatment for infertility and sexual dysfunction.10 The case du jour is

8. See Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that hyperthermia for breast cancer was not covered because it was deemed not
medically necessary and experimental); Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th
Cir. 1985) (stating that an insurer must pay for “immuno-augmentative therapy” provided in
Bahamian clinic by a nonphysician, even though the therapy was not approved by FDA for use
in the U.S.); McLaughlin v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(same); Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Md. 1982) (denying coverage for
laetrile (a chemical found in apricot pits)); Bruno v. Sec. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 522 So. 2d 1242,
1243 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (denying coverage for nutritional supplements prescribed by a
physician because they were not “medically necessary”); Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 259, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an insurer must pay for laetrile therapy
and nutritional therapy for lung cancer); Tudor v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 539 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that an insurer must cover mercury vapor testing by a physician
who “treats the whole person, with biochemical methods and emphasis on elemental
deficiencies and food allergies”); Taulbee v. The Travelers Cos., 537 N.E.2d 670, 676 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that an insurer must pay for immuno-augmentative therapy); Wilson v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 605 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Okla. 1980) (holding that an insurer must pay for
laetrile even though it was made illegal subsequent to the treatment); Jacob v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Or., 758 P.2d 382, 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that immuno-augmentative
therapy fell within an exclusionary provision of insurance contract).
9. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637–42 (1992) (investigating whether or not courts or
insurers should make judgments of medical appropriateness, especially in regards to new, very
expensive, undertested cancer treatments); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The
Controversy over High-Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for
Breast Cancer, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 101, 103–06; Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing
New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1095, 1111–20 (1992) (using Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant (ABMT) as a case study to
demonstrate the inherent problems in relying on judicial assessments of what is or is not
“experimental”).
10. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 426–27 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting) (finding no evidence that the insurer acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying coverage as “experimental in nature”); Facchina v. NECAIBEW Local 176 Health & Welfare Fund, 702 F. Supp. 641, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding it was
arbitrary and capricious to decide that impotence is not an illness; insurer must pay $9,515 for a
prosthetic penile implant, plus attorney fees); Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420
N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that a sex-change operation was medically necessary
for psychological reasons); Kinzie v. Physician’s Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1987) (upholding the trial court’s ruling that as matter of law in vitro fertilization is not
medically necessary to treat an illness; child birth is elective). See generally Hazel Glenn Beh,
Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don’t Want You to Do Those Nasty
Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119 (1998) (examining “health insurer attitudes toward sexual
health, satisfaction, and reproduction by focusing on insurance coverage for treatment of
erectile dysfunction (impotency), gender dysphoria (transsexuality), pregnancy, infertility,
contraception, and abortion”).
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11
weight reduction surgery for obesity. Grouped under the generic
term bariatric surgery, there are a number of surgical procedures
whose common end is to reduce greatly the stomach’s volume.
“Stomach stapling” is the lay term for the most common of these
procedures, but “lap banding” is also quickly gaining popularity.12
A lot could be said about the light that each of these examples
sheds on social concerns at different points in time, but space does
not permit this digression, except for the last example. Like a
minimalist work of abstract art, the bariatric surgery example is
revealing both in what it contains and in what is not there. The fact
that disputes over bariatric surgery are so common in external review,
13
but have not appeared in any significant number in court, indicates
that external review has been successful in meeting its objective of
resolving these disputes more efficiently. On the other hand, the fact

11. Coverage disputes over obesity have also appeared in earlier decades, but not as
consistently. In fact, obesity was the subject of one of the earliest reported medical necessity
cases, Mount Sinai Hospital v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966), which upheld
coverage of ten days of hospitalization for an obese patient undergoing a “starvation diet.” The
court ruled that the medical risks of this aggressive approach warranted hospitalization, and the
decision to take this approach is one that only the patient and the treating physician, not the
insurer, is entitled to make. Id. at 1018–19.
12. Stomach stapling is the lay term for several different versions of “gastric bypass,” each
of which involves surgically reducing the size of the stomach and shortening the length of the
intestinal tract. For a lay description, see Atul Gawande, The Man Who Couldn’t Stop Eating,
NEW YORKER, July 9, 2001, 66, 71. The newer, less invasive procedure uses a laparoscope
through small incisions to encircle the stomach with a plastic band that can be adjusted
following surgery. See Robert E. Brolin, Bariatric Surgery and Long-Term Control of Morbid
Obesity, 288 JAMA 2793, 2793 (2002).
13. I have been able to find only six decisions regarding the medical necessity of weight
reduction surgery, three federal and three state. See Thrasher v. Corporate Sys., Inc., No. 2:01CV-295-C, 2002 WL 31572682, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb 7, 2002) (holding that gastric bypass
benefits were properly denied where insurance policy expressly excluded such benefits);
Livingston v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 900 F. Supp. 108, 118
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (deciding that an insurer’s decision to deny benefits for gastric bypass
because it was cosmetic surgery was not arbitrary and capricious); Exbom v. Cent. States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, No. 88 C 5058, 1989 WL 27453, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21,
1989) (concluding that insurer’s determination that gastric bypass was “experimental” was not
arbitrary and capricious); Hopp v. Grist Mill, 499 N.W.2d 812, 814–15 (Minn. 1993) (holding
gastric bypass necessary to relieve thrombosis of leg); Gilbert v. Durham Life Ins. Co., No. 741,
1986 WL 9703, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1986) (deciding that gastric was bypass benefits
properly denied where insurance policy expressly excluded such benefits); Evans v. W.E.A. Ins.
Trust, 361 N.W.2d 630, 639–40 (Wis. 1985) (holding that school district’s denial of benefits for
gastric bypass to treat obesity was arbitrary and capricious). One case involved workers
compensation insurance (Hopp v. Grist Mill); the rest were about conventional health
insurance. Half were in the 1980s, and half were in the 1990s or later. Two ruled for the patient
(Hopp v. Grist Mill and Evans v. W.E.A. Insurance Trust), and the other four ruled for
the insurer.
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that virtually no other medical-surgical procedure results in external
14
review with any frequency indicates that health insurers may have
given up trying to impose their own concept of medical necessity in
most areas of medicine.
The latter point was confirmed in interviews with insurers, who
said they have greatly reduced the number of treatments that must be
submitted for prior authorization. Also, many insurers said that when
their denials are challenged through internal review, they often agree
to reverse the initial decision rather than incur the costs of a review
and risk the negative publicity, or possible liability, entailed in being
reversed. In short, most major insurers appear to be reverting to their
inflationary ways prior to the 1980s, when provider-friendly insurers
such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield paid for virtually any recognized
treatment that a physician might order, with few or no questions
15
asked. Indeed, one prominent insurer claims to have largely
abandoned medical necessity review by writing its insurance policies
in terms of broad categories of “covered services,” followed by more
specific exclusions, rather than limiting covered services to those that
are medically necessary.16
Medical necessity review is now taking place mainly at the
margins, focusing on treatments that might be considered cosmetic,
custodial, or lifestyle enhancing rather than medically indicated.
Bariatric surgery is one such procedure, but it is also one that can
have compelling medical justification. Obesity is now recognized as a
major public health problem, on par with tobacco and other types of
17
substance abuse. Two-thirds of adults are overweight or obese, up
from one-quarter thirty years ago, and the rate of increase among the

14. See Studdert & Gresenz, supra note 6, at 867–68 (listing only two other surgical
procedures—breast alteration and varicose vein removal—that are regularly appealed).
15. For more documentation of this era, see Hall & Anderson, supra note 9.
16. In confidential interviews, this company said that it defines covered services in part as
those “provided for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing or treating a sickness, injury, mental
illness, substance abuse or their symptoms.”
17. See JoAnn E. Manson & Shari S. Bassuk, Obesity in the United States: A Fresh Look at
Its High Toll, 289 JAMA 229, 229 (2003) (“Obesity has become pandemic in the United
States.”); Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in
the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2003) (“The collective weight
problem has reached epidemic proportions.”); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The
Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity (2001), at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf (last visited Feb. 4,
2004) (“Overweight and obesity have reached nationwide epidemic proportions.”).
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18
“morbidly obese” has skyrocketed in recent years, almost tripling
19
during the 1990s. Medical experts estimate that “[o]besity accounts
for more than 280,000 deaths annually in the United States and will
soon overtake smoking as the primary preventable cause of death if
current trends continue.”20 In addition to mortality, obesity is
associated with more health problems and medical costs than
21
smoking or drinking.
Recognizing the professional and economic opportunities, a large
number of general surgeons and mid-sized hospitals have begun to
specialize in bariatric surgery, and these procedures are being
aggressively marketed directly to the public, through television and
22
the Internet. A professional society now exists for bariatric surgeons,
with membership exceeding 700.23 In 2003, over 100,000 of these
procedures were expected to be performed, roughly double the
number two years earlier, and sixfold over the number performed ten
years ago.24 According to some estimates, as many as 15 to 30 million
25
Americans could be candidates for these procedures. Public interest
has been fueled by the fact that several minor celebrities have

18. These categories are defined by the Body Mass Index (BMI), which is calculated by
dividing weight by the square of height, expressed in metric terms. For adults, the standard
definition of obesity is a BMI greater than 30, overweight is a BMI of 25–29, and morbid obesity
is a BMI greater than 40. For a person 5 feet 2 inches tall, 164 pounds is obese and 219 pounds is
morbidly obese. For a person 6 feet tall, these levels are reached at 221 pounds and 295 pounds
respectively. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, BMI: Body Mass Index, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/bmi/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (on file with Duke Law
Journal).
19. See Katherine M. Flegal, et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults,
1999–2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723 (2002) (finding a 29 percent increase in extreme obesity
between 1988–1994); David S. Freedman et al., Trends and Correlates of Class 3 Obesity in the
United States from 1990 Through 2000, 288 JAMA 1758, 1758 (2002) (finding class 3 obesity
increased from 1 percent to 3 percent of the population from 1988–1994).
20. Manson & Bassuk, supra note 17, at 229.
21. Id.; Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking and Drinking on Medical Problems
and Costs, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 245, 247–48.
22. Mike Mitka, Surgery for Obesity: Demand Soars Amid Scientific, Ethical Questions, 289
JAMA 1761, 1761–62 (2003). For internet examples, see http://www.bariatric.com/; http://www.
coribariatrics.com/; http://clos.net/; http://www.rightweigh.com/; http://liv-lite.com/ (each last
visited Nov. 2, 2003).
23. Liz Kowalczyk, Obesity Surgery Waiting Lists Increase Dramatically at Massachusetts
Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2003, at A1.
24. Mitka, supra note 22, at 1761; Milt Freudenheim, Hospitals Pressured by Soaring
Demand for Obesity Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at A1; Julie Piotrowski, Obesity
Surgery Brings Profits, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 20, 20.
25. Susan Alt, Bariatric Surgery Programs Growing Quickly Nationwide, HEALTH CARE
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, Sept. 2001, at 1, 9; Freudenheim, supra note 24.
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26
undergone the procedure, and it is has been the subject of many
news stories in popular magazines and television shows, such as
27
People and “Oprah.”
Health insurers are justifiably concerned about these trends.
Bariatric surgery costs anywhere from $14,000 to $35,000—just for the
28
surgery—assuming no significant complications. In addition, these
patients incur lifelong costs as high as $100,000 for monitoring the
health problems that can arise from radical alterations to the digestive
system.29 More significantly, bariatric surgery carries serious medical
risks, and obese patients are much greater surgical risks due to
underlying cardiac, circulatory, and/or respiratory problems.
Questions have also been raised about the skill of some of the
physicians doing these procedures and the quality of some of the
institutions where they are performed.30 The risk of death from these
procedures is quite substantial—about 1 out of 100 procedures—and
major complications occur in roughly 10 percent of cases.31
For these reasons, bariatric surgery is not lightly recommended
or undertaken. Guidelines issued by the National Institutes of Health
require that a patient be either “morbidly obese,” which is defined as
32
having a body mass index (BMI) of 40 or more, or that they have

26. For instance, Al Roker, the weatherman on NBC’s “The Today Show” and the singer
Carnie Wilson. Allison Adato & Galina Espinoza, Weighing the Risks, PEOPLE, Mar. 10, 2003,
at 137, 137. Comedienne Roseanne Barr, and Sharon Osbourne, Ozzy’s wife on “The
Osbournes” television show. PEOPLE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 102, 102. Also Michael Genadry, who is
on the television show “Ed.” Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 2, 2003).
27. See, e.g., Adato & Espinoza, supra note 26, at 137; David Kiley, Major Loss Leaves
Major Problem, USA TODAY, May 9, 2002, at 11D; Sophfronia Scott & Ulrica Wihlborg,
Finishing Touches, PEOPLE, June 17, 2002, at 96; Incredible Weight Loss Stories,
http://www.oprah.com/tows/pastshows/tows_2000/tows_past_20001109.jhtml (last visited on Jan.
9, 2004).
28. Alt, supra note 25, at 9. For an estimate of costs due to complications of surgery, see
Benjamin M. Craig & Daniel S. Tseng, Cost-Effectiveness of Gastric Bypass for Severe Obesity,
113 AM. J. MED. 491, 493 (2002) (showing, in Table 1, the average costs for a man to be $26,100,
and the average cost for a woman to be $20,500).
29. Freudenheim, supra note 24. Patients must adhere strictly to limits on what they can
eat, and they often need to take special nutritional and dietary supplements.
30. Mitka, supra note 22, at 1762; Gawande, supra note 12, at 75.
31. Alt, supra note 25, at 13; Craig & Tseng, supra note 28, at 493; Adato & Espinoza,
supra note 26, at 137; Julia Sommerfeld, Weight Loss Surgery Means Weighing Risks, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at A1. For the latest statistics, see AM. SOC’Y FOR BARIATRIC SURGERY,
RATIONALE FOR THE SURGICAL TREATMENT OF MORBID OBESITY (2001), at
http://www.asbs.org/html/ rationale/rationale.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (on file with Duke
Law Journal).
32. See supra note 18.
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significant health problems related to obesity, such as diabetes, heart
33
disease, hypertension or sleep apnea. In addition, these guidelines
state that surgery should be a last resort, only after other methods of
34
weight reduction have failed.
When these procedures are warranted, and are done without
injuring the patient, they do succeed in substantially lowering weight
in most patients. On average, these patients permanently lose half of
35
their excess weight. However, “there is limited evidence addressing
the long-term consequences [of surgery] and its influence on the
quality of life of patients,”36 so a full assessment of the medical costs
37
and benefits has not yet been done.
When insurers deny coverage for bariatric surgery, they do so for
a number of reasons, according to interviews. Sometimes, they
question the skill level of the particular providers proposing to do the
surgery, or they are unwilling to allow the patient to use a preferred
physician or hospital who is not in the insurer’s normal network.
Other times, insurers may decide that a particular patient’s health
condition puts him or her at too great a risk for this procedure. More
frequently, insurers choose to apply criteria for medical necessity that
are more demanding than the treating physician’s. For instance, they
may require both a certain weight level and a set of associated health
problems, rather than regarding obesity itself to be a health
38
condition, or they may require documentation of more aggressive

33. Am. Gastroenterological Ass’n, Medical Position Statement on Obesity, 123
GASTROENTEROLOGY 879, 879 (2002); Nat’l Inst. of Health, Gastrointestinal Surgery for Severe
Obesity: Consensus Development Conference Statement, 55 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 615S,
617S (1992 Supp.).
34. Am. Gastroentreological Ass’n, supra note 33, at 881.
35. Mitka, supra note 22, at 1762.
36. Andrew Clegg et al., The Clinical Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness of Surgery for
People with Morbid Obesity: A Systematic Review and Economic Evaluation vi, available at
http://www.nice.org.uk/pdf/assessmentreport-surgeryforobesity.pdf (2001).
37. Craig and Tseng estimated that gastric bypass surgery does not reduce lifetime medical
costs or increase life expectancy, but it does improve the quality of life. Craig & Tseng, supra
note 28, at 494. However, theirs was not a controlled observational study, and it was based on
assumptions about quality of life rather than direct measures. Thus, for instance, they “assumed
that a person who loses weight has the same quality of life as someone who is at that [same]
reduced rate.” Id. at 493. This assumption is highly questionable considering the severe
restrictions on diet and various digestive problems that accompany drastic reduction in stomach
size, as documented, for instance, in Gawande, supra note 12, at 71–72.
38. For an example of this general approach, which the court rejected as unauthorized by
the insurance policy, see Evans v. W.E.A. Insurance Trust, 361 N.W.2d 630, 633–34, 637–38
(Wis. 1985).
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efforts at nonsurgical weight reduction than the patient has
undergone or is willing to undergo.
39
As noted above, when patients appeal these denials to external,
independent physicians, insurers consistently lose much more often
than they do in other external review cases—almost all of the time
according to most insurers who were interviewed. So far, insurers
40
have not been inclined to challenge these losses in court. Instead,
they have used a number of contractual or business strategies to
respond to the persistent unwillingness of most external reviewers to
honor more conservative approaches to weight reduction surgery. As
the following Part discusses, the success or failure of these strategies
is a revealing case study of the interplay between regulatory agencies
and private initiatives, and of the particular form of economic justice
embodied in health insurers’ definition of medical necessity.
II. INSURERS’ RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL REVIEW DECISIONS
Insurers can respond in four different ways to their persistent
41
inability to sustain coverage denials for weight reduction surgery.
They can simply give in and approve most or all such requests. They
can continue to assert their own standards or criteria for medical
necessity, relying on the authority given to them in the insurance
contract’s general definition of medical necessity. They can attempt to
make the insurance contract more explicit by specifying the particular
medical criteria that will govern coverage of these procedures. Or, the
contract can specifically exclude all weight reduction surgeries.
Interviews with insurers revealed that each approach is taken by at
least some insurers; these interviews also reveal the degree to which
each strategy succeeds or fails.
A. Giving In, and Approving Almost Everything
Most insurers have not simply given in and approved all requests
for bariatric surgery that have a plausible basis. In contrast with many

39. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
40. It is not entirely clear why they have not done so. Possible reasons include avoiding
adverse publicity, the poor chance of success considering the degree of binding authority given
to independent physicians by external review statutes, and concern about setting a negative
precedent that would preclude their flexibility to use some of the strategies discussed in Part II.
41. For a general overview, documenting examples of most of these responses, see Alt,
supra note 25.
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42
other areas of medical necessity review, here, they continue to hold
their ground. They require, for instance, that patients have significant
health problems related to obesity, rather than simply being
extremely obese, or they may insist that patients document repeated
failures of medically supervised weight reduction programs.43 When
challenged on appeal, insurers often lose because external reviewers
believe the insurer is being too demanding in how it applies these
medical necessity criteria, but most insurers who were interviewed
said they nevertheless continue to apply essentially the same criteria
as prior to the advent of external review.
Some insurers said that the consistent string of reversals
prompted them to abandon their particular medical necessity criteria
in favor of those being used by external review physicians. However,
this was a minority response, both for bariatric surgery and for
external review more generally. Most insurers said they have made no
changes to the substance of their medical management policies based
on external review decisions, even after losing. They explained that
these decisions are case-specific and set no binding precedent about
how future cases should be decided. Therefore, even after losing on
appeal, insurers consider themselves free to make essentially the
same decision in future cases. Moreover, they noted that few areas of
medicine produce any volume of appeals, and for those that do,
reviewers’ decisions are often inconsistent, so usually no clear signal
is sent about whether an insurer should change the substance of its
medical criteria.
Insurers also reported that they will occasionally review one of
their medical management policies based on external review losses,
and a few insurers cited instances where they changed coverage policy
when weakly supported criteria or poorly designed internal policies
were brought to light by external review. However, these instances
were exceptions to the usual approach of giving review decisions no
effect beyond a particular case. In general, insurers and their medical

42.
43.

See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., AETNA, COVERAGE POLICY BULLETIN NO. 0157: OBESITY: SURGICAL
TREATMENT (2003), at http://www.aetna.com/cpb/data/PrtCPBA0157.html (stating that the
selection criteria to be considered for gastric bypass requires a patient to have participated in a
physician-supervised weight loss program for at least six months). Other examples of insurers’
medical necessity criteria can be found in the numerous testimonials posted on the following
patient support group website: http://www.obesityhelp.com/morbidobesity/ (last visited on Nov.
2, 2003). This is a rich data source for exploring in more detail a variety of circumstances
relating to bariatric surgery, including the patients’ condition prior to surgery, the type of
procedure done, and patients’ experiences following surgery.
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directors believe their medical management policies have
independent integrity, so they are not inclined to make substantive
changes based simply on isolated or even consistent external review
losses.
The trend toward more lenient prior authorization
44
requirements is driven not by a pattern of losses during external
review, but instead by the simple economics of conducting the
reviews themselves. Insurers explained that they found, after study,
that the costs of conducting medical necessity reviews prior to
treatment exceeded the savings generated in most areas of medicine.
Also, they came to realize how much physicians and patients hate
subjecting themselves to the hassle and delay caused by these reviews.
Thus, avoiding contentiousness and public backlash is another reason
insurers frequently gave for becoming “managed care lite”—i.e.,
scaling back on the list of procedures that require medical necessity
review prior to treatment. However, bariatric surgery remains one of
the areas where most insurers said they still require prior
authorization. Where insurers still conduct prior authorization, they
feel entitled to apply their own legitimate criteria of medical
necessity—even if they consistently lose appeals of these decisions.
B. Writing Insurance Policies to Give Insurers More Discretion
To avoid losing appeals, insurers could tighten up the wording of
their insurance policies in a way that allows them to enforce more
restrictive or demanding standards of medical necessity. Previously,
this was done by stating that medical necessity will be determined at
the insurer’s sole discretion.45 This language was primarily in response
to a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Employee Retirement
46
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) that required federal courts
to defer to insurers’ coverage denials when insurers have this
47
discretionary authority. The creation of external review laws,
however, has negated this deference by mandating that the
independent physician who conducts the review has full discretion

44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. Hall & Anderson, supra note 9, at 1645–48.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000), which regulates employee benefits, such as health insurance,
and governs coverage disputes under employer-sponsored health insurance.
47. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117–18 (1989).
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48
and final authority. Thus, external reviewers are not obligated to
give any deference to the insurer’s initial decision and are told to
apply their own independent medical judgment.
Another tack, then, might be to change the substance of the
general medical necessity definition in insurance contracts. Several
respected health policy experts and groups have articulated relatively
elaborate definitions of medical necessity that permit or require
insurers to assess more rigorously the cost-effectiveness of medical
49
technologies, and some of these definitions have found their way
into insurance policies and even state laws.50 A different set of health
policy experts has mounted a counter-movement, arguing for
definitions of medical necessity that would more conclusively give
treating physicians the final say.51 For the most part, however, neither
movement has taken hold. Interviews revealed that most insurance
contracts continue to use traditional definitions of medical necessity,
or they just use the term without defining it. And most state laws that
define medical necessity continue to do so in a traditionally generic
fashion that refers broadly to “generally accepted principles of
professional medical practice.”52
Despite this inertia, standard definitions of medical necessity are
broad enough that they conceivably could allow insurers to
implement medical necessity in a fashion—consistent with the
53
“respectable minority” rule under medical malpractice law —that

48. Despite this tension with federal law, the Supreme Court has ruled that state external
review laws are not preempted by ERISA, at least in the form enacted in Illinois. See Rush
Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2169 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1995, at 180, 187–88 (positing that medical necessity as a term be deleted in favor of five
more specific criteria; cost effectiveness is one of those criteria); David M. Eddy, Benefit
Language: Criteria that Will Improve Quality While Reducing Costs, 275 JAMA 650, 656 (1996)
(maintaining that cost-effectiveness measures may be imperfect, but are nonetheless necessary
assessments in the cost/quality problem); Sara Singer & Linda Bergthold, Prospects for
Improved Decision Making About Medical Necessity, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2001, at 200, 202
(“Medical directors reported that clearer evidence and cost effectiveness criteria could improve
the utility of contractual definitions.”).
50. STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 3, at 15–19.
51. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229 (1999) (stating that “an insurer should be able to
set aside the recommendations of a treating physician only in restricted circumstances”).
52. STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 3, at 15–16.
53. Regarding the respectable minority rule, see Note, Admissibility of Forensic DNA
Profiling Evidence: A Movement Away from Frye v. United States and a Step toward the Federal
Rules of Evidence: United States v. Jakobetz, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 211 (1993).
The only type of regulation that clearly restricts this approach is one that specifies that the
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enforces the more conservative end of the spectrum of generally
54
accepted medical practices. This possibility was explored in
interviews with both regulators and insurers. The consensus was that
insurers are free for the most part to implement medical necessity
however they want. Doing so is not illegal. However, insurers’ general
standards or specific internal criteria simply are not binding on
external reviewers, for reasons that will now be explained.
Most state law definitions of medical necessity do not overtly
constrain how insurers define the term in their contracts or how they
operationalize the definition internally. In many states, the codified
definition of medical necessity is not explicitly constraining in any
way; the state simply declares a definition but requires no one in
55
particular to adhere to it. Some state laws do impose such a
requirement, and even when they do not, regulators often do so of
their own accord when they review insurance contract forms to
approve them for general use.56 However, most regulators do not see
these definitions as strictly prescriptive. Instead, they allow insurers
to write more elaborate or specified definitions that are broadly
consistent with the general statutory definitions. Moreover, regulators
do not audit or otherwise police how insurers operationalize these
definitions. For instance, in most states, regulators do not
systematically examine insurers’ internal medical management
policies and compare them with external standards of medical
practice to see if they are consistent.57
Thus, for the most part, insurers are free to adopt whatever
medical management standards or criteria they want. They just
cannot enforce them when a case goes to external review (or to

standard in the patient’s state or local community governs medical necessity. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-37-102 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-200(b) (2002). In this regard,
alternative standards of care appear to function opposite of how they do in medical malpractice
law, which sees local standards as being more lenient and national standards as being more
demanding. See Jon Walz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 408–09 (1969).
54. For an extensive discussion of how these standards of practice might be determined
empirically, see Michael A. Hall & Michael D. Green, Empirical Approaches to Establishing the
Medical Standard of Care: Introduction, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663 (2002).
55. See STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 3, at 12 (showing that
only eleven states are required to adhere to the definition of medically necessary).
56. See id. at 12 (“Regulators from twenty-three states reported that general legislation in
their state might impact plans’ definitions of medical necessity even though there is no statemandated definition.”).
57. See id. at 31–39.
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58
court). External review laws give independent physicians final
authority over medical appropriateness for purposes of insurance
coverage. Reviewing physicians do not have to follow how the
insurance contract defines medical appropriateness as long as the
issue is framed in terms of whether the treatment is medically
necessary. At most, reviewers may be given the contract language to
consider, but regulators in the states selected for this case study said
that reviewers do not need to refer to the contractual language in
their decisions. Indeed, in one state, an insurer said that the regulator
had reversed the external reviewer in a few cases where the reviewer
had felt constrained by the contract from honoring the treating
physician’s opinion.
This means that insurers often end up applying a double
standard. They continue to apply their own medical necessity
definitions and criteria at the stages of initial decision and internal
appeal. However, when an external review is filed, they are either
forced to honor a different standard, or they do so voluntarily,
realizing they are likely to lose. Because few cases are brought to
external review, this strategy allows insurers to enforce their own
standards in the vast majority of cases, despite the differing views of
independent physicians. This result may appear unfair or irrational,
but it is the logical outcome of a system in which insurers continue to
take seriously their responsibility to allocate limited medical
resources, and external review is used infrequently and is not
designed to create constraining precedents. This consequence,
whether accidental or intended, is also fully consistent with the
longstanding observation that rationing decisions are more easily
made out of view of public scrutiny.59

C. Contractual Specification of Particular Criteria
One way to avoid external review is to frame a coverage decision
as being based on something other than medical necessity. The
external review statutes in most states apply only to medical necessity
58. Also, courts often refuse to enforce internal criteria that are not specified in the
insurance contract. Hall & Anderson, supra note 9, at 1704–05. For a case of this sort regarding
surgery for obesity, see Evans v. W.E.A. Insurance Trust, 361 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Wis. 1985)
(concluding that the insurance company’s interpretation of the word “sickness” in its guidelines
was arbitrary and capricious when it denied a morbidly obese plaintiff reimbursement for gastric
bypass surgery).
59. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26–27(1978) (“Averting the
eyes enables us to save some lives even when we will not save all.”).
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decisions and not to other types of coverage decisions, such as those
60
based on more specific exclusions of covered benefits. The
distinction is sometimes hard to draw. For instance, interviewees did
not agree on whether coverage exclusions for experimental, cosmetic,
or custodial care are subject to medical necessity review. Under one
view, these are limitations on the scope of covered benefits that are
similar to exclusions for dental care or mental health services.61
According to another view, these exclusions are simply the flip side of
medical necessity; that is, they are ways of articulating in general
terms what is not medical, what is elective rather than necessary, or
what is not accepted practice.
Despite these uncertainties, interviewees thought that there are
clear cases of specific exclusions that are not subject to review.
Excluding some or all transplants is one example. So is excluding
coverage for Viagra, or in vitro fertilization. Rather than exclude
these treatments altogether, insurers sometimes include them only if
certain conditions are met—for instance, they will cover prescriptions
for Viagra but restrict the quantity allowed to a specified number of
62
pills per month, or they will cover certain transplants but only if
specified eligibility criteria are met. The same could be done for
bariatric surgery, but none of the insurers interviewed had done so.
Several explanations were heard for why this is so.
First, insurers were not confident this strategy would work. Some
assumed it would, and this was confirmed by some regulators. But
others (both insurers and regulators) felt that the broader principle
explained above would prevail, under which reviewers are not bound
by contractual specification of clinical criteria for medical necessity,
but instead are free to use their own medical judgment or to follow
63
criteria proposed by others. Apparently, the issue has not been put
to a clear legal test.

60. Kesselheim, supra note 2, at 892–900; see, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S.
Ct. 2151, 2170–71 (2002) (holding that ERISA does not preempt an Illinois HMO statute that
provides external review for claims that a procedure is medically necessary).
61. This explains a possible legal advantage to taking medical necessity language out of
insurance policies altogether, as Professor Havighurst advocates, see Havighurst, supra note 4,
at 64–66, and as one large insurer has done, see supra note 16. Doing this may help to place
coverage denials on a basis that is not as clearly subject to external review.
62. Alison Keith, The Economics of Viagra, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 147, 151.
63. Also, one insurer noted that, in situations where coverage is mandated by state law,
regulators feel more entitled to specify the particular criteria that define the scope of the
covered benefit.
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Second, some insurers thought that this contractually specified
approach is not practical or feasible. They noted that medical criteria
change frequently and are difficult to specify in great detail. In the
words of one insurer, the insurance contract needs to be a “living
document,” that is, one that can adapt to changing circumstances.
This need for a flexible document provides a compelling explanation
for why the detailed specification that some health law scholars
64
advocate may not be a practical solution for most resource allocation
issues.
D. Complete Exclusion of Coverage
Rather than using the insurance contract to specify medical
criteria for bariatric surgery, insurers have begun to exclude coverage
entirely for this type of surgery, regardless of whether or when it is
65
medically necessary. Some insurers said they have done the same for
a variety of other treatments that bridge the boundary between
medically necessary and cosmetic or “lifestyle” enhancements, such as
Viagra (which corrects medically caused impotence)66 or breast
reduction surgery (which can alleviate back strain).
The total exclusion strategy clearly is not socially optimal. It
reflects a market failure induced by regulation because it results from
insurers’ inability to enforce their standards for defining when the
need for these treatments is most compelling. Legally, however, this
strategy succeeds. It keeps the issue away from external reviewers
because a specific and absolute exclusion does not raise any
judgmental issues regarding medical appropriateness.

64. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 178–85 (1995) (“It is doubtful whether health plans can . . .
fully serve the economising interests of their subscribers, in the absence of . . . better
contracts.”); E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal
Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 48–51 (1997) (noting that “a limited number of
standards might enable consumers to become better informed . . . facilitating more intelligent
decisions”).
65. See, e.g., Robarts v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of La., 821 So. 2d 87, 90–91 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a clause giving the insurer final say in coverage created an ambiguity that
had to be interpreted in favor of the insured, who then received compensation for a breast
reduction surgery); Gilbert v. Durham Life Ins. Co., No. 741, 1986 WL 9703, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 5, 1986) (holding that the exclusion of coverage for weight loss was within the plain
meaning of the health care contract).
66. See Keith supra note 62, at 150–51 (discussing the policies of some healthcare providers
to refuse to pay for Viagra, to limit the number of pills per month, or to require higher
copayments).
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According to interviews, regulators in a few states have insisted
that, despite such an exclusion, insurers must cover bariatric surgery
or other excluded treatments when they are medically necessary. In
other words, regulators have not officially mandated that these
treatments be part of covered benefits, but they refuse to enforce
exclusions in cases where the treatment is shown to be medically
necessary, citing broader authority under laws that require HMOs,
for instance, to cover all “basic benefits.” When challenged on this,
67
however, regulators have usually relented, or lost in court. Also,
insurers reported that this regulatory opposition is not widespread.
Still, not all insurers, and perhaps not even a majority, are
excluding bariatric surgery entirely. Several reasons for continuing
68
coverage were given or suggested in interviews. An obvious
possibility is that the excluded service may be one that purchasers
demand. Mitigating against this factor is the negative stigma
regarding obesity and attitudes about personal responsibility for
69
health and weight. Cutting the other way, however, is insurers’
concern that if a specific exclusion becomes widespread, the affected
interest groups will seek a legislative mandate for coverage.70 As
71
noted above, legislative action greatly reduces insurers’ ability to
control the criteria that shape the covered benefit. In this way,
political economy interacts with and responds to market economy.

67. For instance, Kaiser successfully challenged the California Department of Managed
Care’s ruling that it may not specifically exclude coverage of Viagra when it is medically
necessary to treat sexual dysfunction. Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Zingale, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
741, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). The court ruled that the agency lacked the statutory authority for
imposing this restriction. Id. at 745–46. However, one lawyer who specializes in challenging
coverage denials for obesity treatment claims to have a 50 percent success rate even when these
denials are based on specific exclusions. See Obesity Law & Advocacy Ctr., supra note 7.
68. One insurer noted that laws guaranteeing that insurance is renewable at the option of
the subscriber deter making coverage provisions too detailed because each change in a covered
or excluded item technically creates a different policy form, each of which has to be renewed in
perpetuity as long as any one subscriber wishes to keep it. This increases administrative costs
and complexity.
69. For discussion of this point, see Rogan Kersh & James C. Morone, The Politics of
Obesity: Seven Steps to Government Action, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 142, 142
(“Obesity has been the subject of powerful public disapproval for more than a century.”).
70. According to one report, such mandates exist in four states so far. Julie Piotrowski,
Obesity Surgery Brings Profits, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 20.
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
What does the experience with bariatric surgery tell us about
agencies, private initiatives, and economic justice—the topic of this
Symposium? From the perspective of someone concerned about the
need for more affordable health insurance, the record is not as bad as
one might have feared, nor is it as good as one might have hoped.
Insurers have not completely abandoned their role as stewards of
limited medical resources, despite widespread public hostility, intense
resistance from many physicians, and considerable regulatory
barriers. Most insurers continue in some fashion to resist wholesale
coverage of bariatric surgery with few or no questions asked. Because
external review is not frequent, and decisions are only case-specific,
insurers are able in most cases to apply the medical management
criteria that their medical directors and advisors think are legitimate.
Regulation of the definition of medical necessity does not drill down
deep enough into insurers’ internal processes to prescribe particular
substantive approaches to making coverage determinations.
On the other hand, cost considerations remain covert in medical
necessity determinations, rather than being exposed to public scrutiny
or contractual specification. Therefore, resource allocation continues
to occur in a fashion that Professor Havighurst describes as “sub
72
rosa” rather than market specified. Far from making rationing
decisions more explicitly, insurers have greatly scaled back the areas
of medicine in which they are willing to scrutinize medical necessity.
For most of the terrain covered by medical necessity, insurers have
adopted a pass-through attitude toward costs: If physicians and
patients think the treatment is necessary, then the primary role of
insurers is simply to negotiate the best price and reflect these
discounts in their overall insurance premium.73 Insurers have largely
abandoned their direct attempts to limit the utilization rate for most
medical procedures.
This retreat from managed care is not primarily the result of
regulatory or legal policy, however. Instead, it reflects broader social
and professional antipathy to medical decisions being made by

72. Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of
Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (2000).
73. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623–24 (2001)
(noting that insurance companies are focused mainly on cost and cost reduction).

HALL.DOC

672

06/21/04 4:00 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:653
74

anyone other than the affected patient and the treating physician.
Accordingly, the only option left is to control patients’ demand for
care by increasing their out-of-pocket costs, in order to make them
more cost-conscious consumers at the point of treatment
decisionmaking.75 Whether this approach succeeds in containing costs
and improving care, and whether the public is any happier with it
than with managed care, remains to be seen.

74. M. Gregg Bloche, One Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressures and the Evolution of
Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 22–48 (M. Gregg Bloche
ed., 2003).
75. Victor Fuchs, What’s Ahead for Health Insurance in the United States?, 323 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1822 (2002); Jason S. Lee & Laura Tollen, How Low Can You Go? The Impact of
Reduced Benefits and Increased Cost Sharing, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 1; James C.
Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost-Sharing in Health Insurance Benefit Design,
HEALTH AFF., May/June 2002, at 16, 30–31.

